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Abstract 
 
The last years have seen a growth in research on “good governance” and the quality 
of government institutions. This development has been propelled by empirical 
findings that such institutions might hold the key to understanding economic growth 
in developing countries. We argue that a key issue has not been addressed, namely the 
question of what “good governance”—or the quality of government —actually means 
at the conceptual level. Economists’ definitions are either extremely broad or suffer 
from a functionalist slant that weakens their applicability. We argue that a more 
coherent and specific definition of quality of government is necessary to attain, and 
propose one such definition, namely the impartiality of government institutions that 
implement government policies. The argument is based on the idea that a democratic 
system has two sides that are guided by opposite norms: partisanship for the 
representational process and impartiality for the process of implementation. 
 
 
Introduction1 
The last years have seen a rapid growth in research on “good governance” and the 
quality of government institutions. This development has largely been propelled by 
empirical findings among economists that such institutions might hold the key to 
understanding economic growth in developing countries (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2002; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Clague et al. 1999; Easterly 
2001; Easterly and Levine 2003; Hall and Jones 1999; Knack and Keefer 1995; 
Mauro 1995; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). The quality of government has 
however also been argued to have substantial effects on diverse non-economic 
phenomena, both at the individual level—such as subjective happiness (Frey and 
Stutzer 2000; Helliwell 2003) and citizen support for government (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003)—and at the level of society—such as the incidence of civil war 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003) and democratic consolidation (Rose and Shin 2001; Zakaria 
2003).  
This perspective has shifted the focus away from variables such as physical capital, 
natural resources, and human capital to matters directly related to the sphere of 
government and politics. The emphasis is also different from some previous studies 
that points at long-term cultural traits related to the importance of social capital 
(Putnam 1993). Social capital, defined as norms about reciprocity and generalized 
trust in other people, seems to be determined by the quality of government institutions 
rather than the other way around (Letki 2003; Rothstein 2003; Rothstein 2005; 
Rothstein and Stolle 2003). 
We shall argue however that a key issue has this far not been addressed by this 
research agenda: the question of what “good governance”—or the quality of 
government (QoG for short), as we will henceforth call it—actually means at the 
conceptual level. Economists’ definitions are either extremely broad or suffer from a 
functionalist slant that weakens their applicability. Kaufmann and associates at the 
World Bank, responsible for providing the most widely used governance indicators, 
define governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised”. More specifically, this includes: 
(1) the process by which government are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the 
capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and 
(3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004, 3). 
That definition is just about as broad as any definition of “politics”. It includes both 
issues of the access to power and the exercise of power. Moreover, it fails to 
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distinguish between the content of specific policy programs on the one hand and the 
governing procedures on the other. In the words of Keefer (2004, 5), “if the study of 
governance extends to all questions related to how groups of people govern 
themselves …, then there are few subjects in all of political science and political 
economy that do not fall within the governance domain”. Yet clearly some political 
institutions or aspect of “politics” must matter more than others. Put shortly - if 
governance is everything, then maybe it is nothing. 
Other economists have tried to be more specific by defining “good governance” as 
“good-for-economic-development” (La Porta et al. 1999, 223). But this view excludes 
other non-economic consequences of QoG referred to above, such as interpersonal 
trust and subjective well-being. Even more importantly, as with all functionalist 
definitions it comes at the expense of being unable to speak about a country’s access 
to QoG without first having to measure the effects of QoG. As with many other 
functionalist definitions, this approach borders on tautology. As noted in a recent 
special report by The Economist (June 4th, 2005),  defining “good governance” as 
“good-for-economic-development” might generate the following infinite regress: 
“What is required for growth? Good governance. And what counts as good 
governance? That which promotes growth.” 
Although it avoids omitting non-economic outcomes, basically the same criticism 
applies to the definition provided by Huther and Shah (2005, 40): 
Governance is a multifaceted concept encompassing all aspects of the exercise of 
authority through formal and informal institutions in the management of the resource 
endowment of a state. The quality of governance is thus determined by the impact of 
this exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens. 
To paraphrase: “What is required for the quality if life enjoyed by citizens? Quality of 
governance. What is quality of governance? That which promotes the quality of life.” 
In this paper we shall argue that a more coherent, widely accepted and yet specific 
definition of QoG is possible to attain. We will propose one such definition based on a 
normative criterion: impartial government institutions. The paper is organized as 
follows. After outlining the general theoretical argument for the impartiality principle 
in the following section, we discuss the relationship between this principle and 
competing notions of the “good”. We then relate impartiality to some more specific 
phenomena that have dominated the empirical field of research on QoG. We end by 
some concluding remarks on the future of this field. 
 
Quality of Government as Impartiality 
Let us begin this section with a true story: Just across the street from Virgie Airport 
on St Lucia—a beautiful island in the Caribbean, but also a pretty poor country with a 
per capita GDP around 5000 US$—are two run down sheds from which coffee and 
food is served. The sheds that can easily be seen from the airport entrance, are in a 
really bad state. Outside, where people are supposed to eat and drink, there are no real 
tables or chairs, just broken stools and pallets that have been thrown over. The result 
of this sad outlook is that hardly any tourists become customers, although many are 
waiting for their planes to leave and thus have plenty of spare time. However, if you 
dare to use their service, you will find the local food they serve cheap and excellent, 
the women running these small businesses very friendly and the location, just along 
the beach with a postcard view of the ocean shore, absolutely stunning. Lots of 
tourists travel by this airport, but few of them frequent these two small places to get a 
cup of coffee, a snack or a meal, probably because they look so run down. Instead, 
most tourists go to the restaurant inside the airport building which is quite expensive, 
very crowded, has no view, lousy service and serves really bad food. 
If you ask the women who run the coffee shops why they don’t make better use their 
tourist perfect and very favorable location, for example by investing in a porch and 
put up some chairs and tables to attract more business from the tourist crowd, they 
will answer in the following way. “Great idea, I’ve thought about it, but there are two 
problems. First, although I have been here for twenty years, I don’t owe this place of 
land, I’m a squatter so I can be forced away by the police/government at any time. 
Secondly, if I did invest and opened a real restaurant/coffee shop, I could probably 
never afford to pay off the health inspectors.” Further conversation reveals that the 
women don’t know if it is at all possible to buy the land or at least get a long-term 
lease, and they don’t know how much they would have to pay in bribes to the health 
inspectors. It is the uncertainty of their situation and the difficulty and the lack of 
impartiality in the civil service that hinders them from making better use of the great 
resources they already have.  
There are probably thousands of stories like this from poor or semi-poor countries like 
St Lucia. Lack of an impartial legal structure that can secure property rights and 
administrative/political corruption hinders many “micro business people” from 
making investments that in all likelihood would vastly improve their (and their 
country’s) economic situation (de Soto 2001). This little story serves to highlight that 
it is not necessarily the lack of entrepreneurship or resources in human or physical 
capital that hinders economic development, but the low quality of government 
institutions that exercise and implement laws and policies. Not being able to predict 
government action when it reaches you and the lack of accurate information about 
what government bureaucrats can and cannot do to you are central ingredients in this 
problem (cf. Evans 2005; Lange 2005). 
Our argument for a more precise definition of QoG is based on the idea of the 
importance of impartiality in the exercise of governmental power. We will develop 
the causal link between QoG as impartiality and development more in a later section, 
but in brief our argument for choosing impartiality is the following. First, impartiality 
makes it possible for agents outside the state to make predictions of its actions. 
Making predictions are at the heart of the rationale in any economic calculus, be it 
investing in a business or in an education. Secondly, a government whose actions are 
predictable is from a citizen perspective of high quality because different life plans 
can be made with more accuracy and lower risk. Thirdly, impartial institutions can 
help to solve many problems of coordination and collective action, because parties in 
a potential conflict can use them to lower transaction costs and monitor treacherous or 
rent-seeking behavior. Fourth, impartial bureaucracies can provide reliable 
information, for example about possible business partners (cf. Evans and Rauch 
1999).2 Lastly, the principle of impartiality stands against discrimination, corruption 
and overt arbitrariness in the exercise of government power. Groups of people who’s 
common knowledge is that “people like us” are most likely to be discriminated 
against or dealt with in an arbitrary manner by government agents, are not likely to 
make long term investments in productive projects, be it there own education or some 
small scale business project. 
Our definition of impartiality in the exercise of public power is the following: When 
implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take anything about 
the citizen/case into consideration that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the 
law (Strömberg 2000). As Cupit writes; “To act impartially is to be unmoved by 
certain sorts of consideration – such as special relationships and personal preferences. 
It is to treat people alike irrespective of personal relationships and personal likes and 
dislikes” (Cupit 2000).3 This goes also for decisions about recruitment to the civil 
service, implying that it should be based on the merits and qualifications that 
beforehand are stated as necessary for the position (instead of personal contacts, 
political leanings or ethnic belonging4). Things like money (in the form of bribes), 
political or family connections, ethnicity, religion, age, sex, social class, etc. are to be 
irrelevant for the decisions made by the bureaucracy unless it is stipulated in the 
law/policy. For example, implementing a law stating that families with children under 
a certain age are entitled to child allowances (or tax deductions) is not to break the 
principle of impartiality, while denying families from a certain clan or tribe such 
allowances when implementing such a policy is. 
QoG a s  P roc ed ure ,  N ot  Conten t  
Before we go into an argument for why impartiality in the exercise of government 
power should be seen as the essence of QoG, it is necessary to place the impartiality 
concept in a political context. One reason for limiting QoG to what happens on the 
“output” side of government is that we find it difficult to argue that policies as such 
usually could become a problem for QoG. Instead, we argue that it is the exercise of 
government power in the implementation of policies, rather than the policies proper 
that is the problem for reaching high QoG. We disagree with the idea put forward in 
some corruption and QoG research that it is “big” government that is the problem. 
The argument has for example been put forward by Tanzi (2000) that in order to 
reduce corruption, is it necessary to reduce the size of government and its control over 
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the economy and privatize. Also in parts of development studies, it has been argued 
that it is the size of government that is the problem. The “small is better” argument 
was also part of the “shock-therapy” argument for massive and quick privatizations 
launched at the post-socialist societies.  
Let us give three examples why we think this is an untenable idea, namely health care, 
social insurance (e.g., pensions) and education. If universally provided by the 
government, these policies would greatly enhance the size of the public budget. From 
both an economic and a democratic perspective, there are arguments for public 
provision (and higher taxes) and for private provision (and lower taxes) of these 
services. However, the important thing when it comes to QoG is not if these services 
are provided by the government or left to the market (or if you have different mixes 
between private and public provision). What is central for QoG is that if these 
services are provided for by the state, it must be done so that the principles of 
impartiality in the implementation process are respected. The problem is not the 
policies as such, but if you, as is customary in for example some post-socialist 
countries, can buy a university degree, or if you have to bribe publicly employed 
physicians to do what they are paid to do (Kornai 2000), or if your access to social 
insurance benefits are decided in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. The same 
goes for policies that are put in place to spur economic growth, such as credits to 
businesses, state-directed investments and the possibility for private firms to put in 
bids for public contracts. As Atul Kohli has shown in his analysis of South-Korea, 
Brazil and India, large scale state intervention can play a positive role in economic 
development (Kohli 2004). It seems obvious that public policies on a large scale can 
be carried out by the state without compromising QoG. Our hypothesis is that this 
works as long as they are implemented in accordance with the impartiality principle. 
In short, it is not so much what the state does, but how it does it, that is central to this 
problem. 
That the size of government or how extensive its policies are has little or nothing to 
do with QoG was actually discovered in one of the first articles in this line of research 
published by a group of economists (La Porta et al. 1999). Using a wealth of data 
from between 49 and 212 countries in their search for what determines QoG, they 
came to the following conclusion: “Finally, we have consistently found that the better 
performing governments are larger and collect higher taxes. Poorly performing 
governments, in contrast, are smaller and collect fewer taxes” (La Porta et al. 1999, 
266).  
That the size of government and QoG should not be causally related should have been 
realized from a quick glance of the data. One finds particularly large governments in 
the Nordic countries but these countries are also, according to most measures, the 
least corrupted. However, we cannot but point at that the economists in the above 
mention article were quick to add (in the very next sentence) that “this result does not 
of course imply that it is often, or ever, socially desirable to expand a government of a 
given quality, but it tells us that identifying big government with bad government can 
be highly misleading” (ibid.). 
We would certainly agree that governments can enact policies that are 
counterproductive to economic growth and they can certainly also launch policies that 
threaten democratic principles and respect for human rights. However, exactly which 
policies that benefits economic growth is often difficult to define – as the above 
mentioned examples show. Should pensions be a private or a public matter, or any 
mix thereof? Should the government be engaged in helping small firms grow (for 
example by providing credits)? Is an active labor market policy a “sound policy” or 
not?  Another example would be the economic “shock-therapy” policies of 
privatization in some of the former Soviet countries. Some economists have argued 
that these policies have been good for economic growth, while others have argued that 
they have not but instead created a robber-baron crony capitalism that hinders growth. 
The latter would imply that a radical decrease in the size of government even in a 
post-socialist country need not be good for economic growth. Moreover, governments 
that launch policies that violate democratic principles and human rights are also likely 
to break with the principle of impartiality in the implementation process. One could 
go one step further and argue that violation of human rights usually entails a break 
with the principle of impartiality (we will return to the issue of impartiality and 
political rights below).  
The second argument for reserving QoG to the exercise of government power is that 
there is a “Platonian-Leninist” risk in this discussion, namely that the democratic 
process will be emptied of most substantial questions if experts from various 
international organization (or those with superior knowledge in scientific Marxism) 
prescribes almost all public policies. After all, what should political parties do and 
what is the point in having an ideological debate and election campaigns if all policies 
are decided beforehand by international experts? If QoG becomes a way for experts to 
define what are to be understood as “sound policies”, there is not much left for 
political parties and politicians to decide on the representational side of the 
democratic system. The argument against the “Platonian-Leninist” alternative to 
democracy has been eloquently presented by Robert Dahl and we accept his 
conclusion that “its extraordinary demands on the knowledge and virtue of the 
guardians are all but impossible to satisfy in practice” (Dahl 1989, 65). However, 
when a policy is decided by an open and impartial democratic process (more on this 
below), the demand for QoG means that it has to be implemented in accordance with 
the principle of impartiality. 
QoG a s  Exe rc i s e  o f ,  N o t  Acce s s  t o  Powe r  
Apart from distinguishing procedure from policy contents, reserving QoG to be a 
matter of the former, we may make the further distinction between the “input” and the 
“output” side of the political process. Whereas the former relates to the access to 
political power, the latter refers to how political power is exercised. This distinction, 
which also may be stated in terms of the electoral/representational and the 
implementation side of the political process, also serves to highlight that we usually 
have two very different ideas about what should be the normative standards in a 
political system, and that this division so far has been under-theorized in political 
philosophy. On the input side, where access to power is determined, the most widely 
accepted regulatory principle is democracy. Democracy, however, by its very nature 
is a partisan affair. Elected representatives are supposed to pursue some partisan 
interest, be it for their political party, home constituency, ideology or some bundle of 
other interests (cf. Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996). The input side of the political 
system is where we have organized interests, ideologies and political parties 
competing with each other to gain as much electoral support they can to further their 
partisan interests. In most modern democracies, the more or less class based left-right 
dimension has come to dominate, although ethnic, religious, regional and in some 
countries gender interests have also become important. In any case, what makes this 
part of the democratic system “tick” is that one interest stands against another, or 
representatives of different ideological world views confront each other. For many, 
this partisanship is what democracy is all about.  
However, when the result of this interest struggle shall be turned into policies and 
especially the exercise of policies, a very different normative principle usually comes 
into focus, namely impartiality. We usually find it troublesome if policies are 
implemented in a partisan way, for example to give special favors to people who are 
rich enough to pay bribes, who belong to the right clan, who are male, who are of a 
certain religion, ethnicity or high social status. For many, equality before the law is an 
equally strong democratic principle as is the right to struggle for that ones preferred 
ideological views will get an electoral majority (Zakaria 2003).  
Our argument is that whereas the exercise of government power must be impartial, 
democracy at its heart is partial. To take an example, we usually find it perfectly 
legitimate that a political party argues for more resources to a certain groups (e.g., 
families with children, more subsidies to farmers, better possibilities for minorities, 
etc.) or a certain cause (higher education/research, vocational education for the 
unemployed, more international aid). Here, impartiality is hardly a legitimate or 
effective argument. Instead politics is an ideological and very partisan struggle 
between different interests. However, once these policies are in place, we would 
usually get very upset and find that basic normative principles are violated if these 
partisan policies were not implemented according to the standards of impartiality.5 
The reason is that policies and laws, however directed to support certain causes or 
groups, are to be constructed in a universal manner so that like cases are treated alike 
without regard to any characteristics of the parties involved other than those defined 
in advance in the law/policy as relevant (Barry 1995, 18). Thus, two farmers that 
operate under the same conditions should get an equal amount of subsidies and the 
farmer who has supported the ruling party shouldn’t get a more favorable treatment. It 
is this universality in the construction of policies/laws that together with impartial 
implementation that makes the exercise of government power predictable and that 
thus should count as the core of QoG. 
In his book Justice as Impartiality, the renowned political philosopher Brian Barry 
argues that impartiality should also be a normative criteria on the ”input” side of the 
democratic process, not only on the “output” side. However, a close reading of Barry 
reveals that when it comes to the decision about what policies the government should 
pursue, it is not impartiality but “reasonableness” that is his main criteria (Lundström 
2004). By this he means that people engaged in the political process should give good 
arguments based on a secular understanding of knowledge for why they prefer certain 
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policies over other. Or in other words, politics should not be driven by interests but by 
the type of argumentation that are (supposed to be) used in academic seminars. “What 
is required is as far as possible a polity in which arguments are weighed and the best 
arguments wins, rather than one in which all that can be said is that votes are counted 
and the side with the most votes wins” (Barry 1995, 103). 
In addition to what we have said above, we have two objections to this idea. First, 
reasonableness is not the same as impartiality. To present good reasons for lowering 
pensions and giving the money to families with children is not the same as being 
impartial between these two groups, because there is no such thing as an impartial 
way to decide in a case like this who should get how much (Arneson 1998). Secondly, 
there remains the question of what should be done with people who, in Barry’s 
opinion, present unreasonable arguments for their preferred policies. Usually, we set 
our hope to that they do not get a majority to support their claims. But it is clear to us 
that this would not be enough for Barry, since a majority can be in favor of policies 
that are not only partisan, but also, from some unknown criteria, deemed 
unreasonable. Unfortunately, we are left in the dark who should decide what is a 
reasonable (or an unreasonable) argument in an ideological/political campaign and 
thus what arguments should count as “best”. We think that a lot of the critique that 
Barry’s theory has gotten from other philosophers is because he does not distinguish 
between impartiality on the “input side”, which we think is futile, and impartiality on 
the output side (which we think is both possible and central to QoG). A large part of 
the critique that has been directed against Barry’s theory is to our mind due to his 
conflation of the input and output side of the democratic system and his idea that 
impartiality should not only guide implementation but also the production of public 
policies (cf. de Jasay 1996). 
The  S cope  o f  Imp ar t i a l i t y  
The idea of the impartial bureaucrat is certainly not new. On the contrary, it goes back 
to the most central figure in bureaucratic theory – namely Max Weber. There is, 
however, a long tradition in public administration research arguing for the 
ineffectiveness of the bureaucratic/impartial mode of operating the state machinery. 
The bureaucratic mode of operation has been said to be too rigid for the active 
modern policy-oriented state. In this line of reasoning, the ideal of the impartial civil 
servants have been accused of being insensitive to the complexities and special needs 
of different cases (cf. Rothstein 1996). The result is that they apply a standard set of 
universal rules to very different situations which in some cases makes their decisions 
obsolete or contrary to the initial intentions behind the law/policy. Since it is 
impossible for the law/policymaker to foresee every situation or case, rigid rule 
following can according to this critique create massive inefficiency and 
implementation failures. 
Another critique has come from the public choice approach that have argued that civil 
servants are driven more by self-interest to promote their own interests rather than 
ethics related to some public interest (such as impartiality). A third critique has come 
from within the field of political philosophy, not least the multi-culturalist and 
feminist approaches.6 The argument has been that impartiality is in fact impossible to 
achieve because individuals, be they civil servants or whatever, can not step outside 
themselves. Instead, their actions will always be impregnated by things like 
ideological commitments, gender (whether socially constructed or not), cultural-
ethnic belongings, class background, etc. Moreover, it has been stated that partiality is 
the idea of life itself – to be deeply attached to other persons and causes is what life is 
really about and that impartiality is an offence against this inner meaning of life 
(Mendus 2002, 2f). The idea of “justice as impartiality” is according to this line of 
critique a non-starter simply because it is not within human capacity to be impartial. 
As the feminist political philosopher Iris Marion Young states, “no one can adopt a 
point of view that is completely impersonal and dispassionate, completely separated 
from any particular context and commitments” (Young 1993, 127f). Furthermore, 
some feminist scholars have argued that the idea to create justice by following 
universal rules is connected to a male type of thinking about justice, while women (or 
individuals in general with more experience of caring for others) instead follow a 
“logic of care” in which every case is to be judged upon its own specific and 
contextually decided needs. 
We will address these objections to the impartiality principle by starting with an idea 
launched by Michael Walzer (1983), namely that our type of societies exists of 
different moral spheres that have different modes of domination that normatively 
should not be transferable. Walzer’s theory is, in short, that we have different 
normative ideas of what should count as fairness in different societal spheres. For 
example, while it is normatively fair to use money to get ones way in market 
transactions, it is not so when it comes to politics (for example we do not allow the 
buying and selling of votes). Principles of what should count as fair distribution are 
different in different social spheres, which make it impossible to produce any 
universal idea of fair distribution. What is important for us with Walzer’s approach is 
not only the idea that norms should be different in different social spheres, but that the 
same individual has to recognize that he or she can go from one sphere to another and 
thus have to change what norms to apply. Moreover, power that comes from the 
distribution in one sphere (i.e., the market) should not be allowed to give power in 
other spheres (politics, religion, science).  
Impartiality is a norm that government power should be exercised according to certain 
moral impediments.7 As a principle it stands against the public choice idea of 
bureaucrats maximizing their self- interest.8 For example, the impartial civil servant 
should not be susceptible for bribery, should not decide in cases where her/his friends 
and relatives are involved, and should not favor any special (ethnic, economic, or 
other type of organized) interest when applying laws and rules. Impartiality thus 
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 The debate within political and moral philosophy between impartialists and their critics is huge 
and we cannot here give it the attention it deserves. See Mendus (2002) for an overview.  
7
 We do not think that impartiality is equivalent to “objectivity”. Terminology is a tricky business, 
especially if you trade in a language that is not your own. Still we would say that as a concept 
objectivity has an absolute and perfectionist ring that implies that humans can have full knowledge of a 
case and weigh all things equal and come down with a decision as if the outcome was of a natural law 
process. Impartiality for us implies somewhat more human and realistic demands. First, it is about a 
“matter of factness” (Sw. “saklighet”), implying that things that according to the policy/law should not 
have an impact on the decision also have to be left out. Secondly, it requires that the public official 
should not be a party to the case, neither directly nor indirectly. 
8
 The empirical support for the public choice approach on what motivates bureaucrats is very thin – 
see for example Brehm (1997) and Jones (1999).  
serves as a constraint on the civil servant’s pursuing of self interest or promotion of 
any particular interest.  
One problem with Walzer’s theory is that the number of such moral spheres seems to 
be both infinite and arbitrary. As he says, his theory is not meant to be universal and 
there is no concept or theory beyond his idea of the existence different moral spheres 
that explains why he ends of with the ones he present. We want to present a solution 
to this problem by starting from an idea of dimensions of interests. One way to 
understand interest is to see it along two different dimensions. One is the type of 
interest, the other is scope. Type refers to the distinction between self-interest and 
public interest. Scope refers to how many are included, if the type of interest that 
dominates is to be for “everyone” or if it is restricted to ones friends, family, clan or 
other such group. If we contrast these two dimensions, we get the following four 
spheres of conduct that relates to impartiality. 
  
Figure 1. Dimensions of interest and societal spheres 
 
 
      
 Type of Interest 
 
     Public Interest
   Self-Interest 
 
 
“All”    The State     
The Market 
Scope of  
interest 
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The logic of this model is the following. In the ”state” sphere, the norm is that 
exercise of power should be in line with the public interest and that this goes for “all”, 
as stated in the principle about equality before the law.  In the “market” sphere, the 
accepted norm is that behavior according to self-interest is justifiable, but the scope 
dimension “all” implies that everyone should have equal access to the market 
(exemplified in, e.g., laws against monopolies/trusts and other ways to hinder open 
competition). We should simply sell and buy from everyone regardless of his family 
background, ethnic belonging, or religion. However, the accepted norm in the private 
sphere is that we should not behave according to self-interest against our family 
members or friends, but to what we from some altruistic notion deem as good for all 
the members of this small group. This includes acting in a way that serves the 
family/clan members but that is to a disadvantage for oneself (i.e., pure altruism). 
However, such groups do not like the market have free entrance but are restricted to 
its given “members”. Lastly, special interests groups are driven by the idea to make 
things better for their members (self-interest), and they are also restricted to members. 
Members are leaders of such groups can not be expected to act from any “public” 
interest. On the contrary, what they do is based on some “logic of exchange”. This is 
where we find policies and practices related to what usually is labeled “neo-
corporatist” or “interest-group” politics (for a somewhat related idea, see Lange 
2005). 
The point we want to take from this model is that social science should not be based 
on the idea that society is dominated by only one type of human behavior, be that self-
interest, the principle of care, rent-seeking, bureaucratic ethics or altruism. For 
example, a large part of the critique that has been directed against Brian Barry’s 
Justice as Impartiality misses this important distinction between “spheres of 
behavior”. While for many, increased justice implies policies that contain more 
partiality (for example, extra resources to underprivileged groups), they usually do not 
want these policies, ones enacted, to be implemented in a partial way (Tebble 2002; 
Young 1990). According to our model, humans have a greater repertoire than being 
only self-interested, etc., and they usually do understand that what is appropriate in 
one sphere is fundamentally wrong in another sphere (March and Olsen 1989). From a 
normative perspective, we can also see that while self-interest is justifiable in some 
spheres, it is unacceptable in others. For example, agents on a market that would use 
self-interest as their main template of behavior would simply be deemed stupid and 
probably soon go out of business, while civil servants or parents that act according to 
pure self-interest by most people are seen as morally deplorable. 
According to this model, QoG as impartiality implies the following. In “the state” 
sphere, we are concerned that the typical civil servant, policeman or judge act 
according to the impartiality principles, implying that he or she should be guided by 
the public interest instead  of any self-interest and make decisions according to what 
is stipulated and intended in the law/policy disregarding his/her own interests. The 
special interests that are acceptable in the other spheres (money from the market, 
loyalties to families and friends and adherence to different special interests) should 
not be allowed to influence her decisions. This is Max Weber’s famous “sine ira et 
studio” principle. However, we have no moral objections when this persons leaves the 
court room or public office and goes to the “market” and tries to get the very best deal 
when selling his house or buying a new car. Likewise, we do not object if this person 
in his private dealings takes special care for his family and friends (cf. Barry 1995, 
205).9 However, we object strongly if he in his professional life does not refrain from 
handling cases that concerns members of his family or friends. 
Moreover, as a private individual we would argue that this person has the same right 
as every other citizen to support whatever special interests or political cause she 
wants. But again, if this person is strongly involved or engaged in a certain cause or 
interest organization, she should declare a conflict of interest and abstain from 
handling a case that may influence the outcome of this cause or be of importance to 
this interest organization. Likewise, a civil servant that handles public contract can not 
have economic interests in any of the potential bidders. Thus, the demand for 
impartiality from civil servants is not absolute and we do not base the idea of QoG as 
impartiality that there are certain persons who have it in their nature to be 
disinterested in all straits of life. What we do demand is that people employed to 
exercise government power recognize that there are clear boundaries between this 
sphere and other societal spheres and that these boundaries put severe restrictions on 
what type of behaviour that can be accepted. For example, civil servants, judges, 
policemen, public school teachers in ethnically divided societies have to find a way to 
treat citizens from other ethnic background than their own with, to use Ronald 
Dworkin’s phrase, “equal concern and respect”(Dworkin 1977, 180ff).10 The demand 
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 The judge or civil servant is allowed to read as many pedagogically advanced bed-time stories for 
his children as he likes, for example, without being blamed for not respecting the ideal of impartiality 
(not all children get read bed-times stories). 
10
 To give a counter example, there are studies showing that the violence that led to the civil war in 
former Yugoslavia broke out after the decision by the President in the newly formed Croatian republic 
to fire all policemen in Croatia of Serbian origin, along with the wholesale dismissal of Serbian 
teachers, doctors, and local officials. When the newly formed Croatian state set up its new army, the 
government made it clear that only ethnic Croats need apply (Schiemann 2002b). For the Serbs living 
in the new Croatia, especially those living in the Serb dominated enclave known as Kraina,  these were 
unmistakable signals that they and their children could count on a future of widespread discrimination 
in all dealings with authorities, schools, hospitals, etc. See Bennett (1995) and Schiemann (2002a). 
for impartiality in the implementation of public policies implies that individuals 
understand and accept that what is perfectly just in one sphere can be a gross violation 
of conduct in another sphere. We can illustrate this point by referring to the fact that 
common language uses different words for different kinds of transgressions. When 
norms from the market are imported to the state sphere, it is usually called bribes. 
When norms from the family/clan sphere are important, the word is usually nepotism 
or patronage. Lastly, when it is norms from the interest group sphere that are used, the 
problem is usually called corporatism or influence peddling (cf. the 
“military/industrial complex”).  
 
Excu r su s :  Ca re ,  Soc i a l  s e rv i c e s  and  Imp ar t i a l i t y  
Some feminist scholars have pointed to the possibility of a conflict between the 
principle of impartiality and the capacity of the state to deliver the kind of social 
services required of public sector employees in the welfare state who must perform 
curative and caring work. Following feminist theorist Joan Tronto, Helena Stensöta 
has argued that we expect, e.g., preschool teachers, medical professionals, and social 
workers to demonstrate empathy and compassion and not be governed by some 
general and abstract logic of justice as impartiality (Olofsdotter 2002). According to 
this approach the “logic of care” leads to a more context-dependent ethic than the 
impartial application of universal rules. In specific terms, we do not want a nurse in a 
public hospital to treat all patients alike but to give more care and attention to those 
who need it. 
We agree that the “logic of care” can come into conflict with impartiality, but still 
maintain that this conflict may rest in a dimension other than that what we have tried 
to specify here. Certainly, most of us want children who attend a public preschool to 
be approached with empathy and concern, rather than some dry-as-dust impartiality 
based on principle. Our argument that this logic of care is not in conflict with 
impartiality simply because it is stated in the policy that such teachers should give 
extra care to those children they see as in need of extra care based on their 
professional training. Obviously, most people would be morally upset if preschool 
staff deliberately directed their care and concern only towards children from rich 
families or from certain ethnic groups and thus in practice discriminated against other 
children. In this perspective, there is no conflict between professionally distributed 
care and the principle of impartiality. As stated above, impartiality does not imply that 
everyone should have the same, but that only matters that are prescribed beforehand 
in the policy/law may come into consideration. 
Impartiality and Competing Conceptions of the “Good” 
The principle of impartial government institutions is not the sole normative yardstick 
with which a political system may be assessed. In this section we relate this principle 
to a tripartite set of competing conceptions of what constitutes “good” government: 
the rule of law, democracy, and efficiency/effectiveness.11 We will argue that the 
impartiality principle implies and encompasses the rule of law, while the opposite is 
not true. Democracy, on the other hand, is related to a different dimension of the 
political system. Although there is some conceptual overlap, the relationship between 
democracy and impartial government institutions is thus mostly empirical. 
Efficiency/effectiveness, finally, works as a constraint on the extent to which 
impartiality can be realized in practice. As opposed to impartiality and democracy, 
however, efficiency/effectiveness lacks an independent normative justification. 
The  Ru le  o f  Law 
“One cannot get through a foreign policy debate these days”, writes Carothers (1998, 
95), “without someone proposing the rule of law as a solution to the world’s 
troubles”. Establishing the rule of law is usually placed high on the agenda for 
reforming developing and transitional countries. But what does “the rule of law” 
mean? Although unequivocally embraced as a virtue of any political system, the 
concept is rarely defined. One reason for this might of course be that the concept is 
inherently ambiguous. As a recent review article makes clear, even legal scholars 
argue over its exact meaning (Rose 2004). To begin with, they dispute whether the 
rule of law should be given a purely procedural interpretation, bearing no implications 
for the actual substance of promulgated laws. Defenders of a procedural notion claim 
that the rule of law must be distinguished from the rule of “good” law. Critics argue 
that this would allow morally detested regimes, such as Nazi Germany, to be 
classified as abiding to the rule of law.12 Against the procedural view, they seek to 
inscribe the rule of law with various substantive moral values of liberal democracy. 
This broadened notion of course adds to the conceptual confusion. Yet even among 
proceduralists, who adhere to a narrower conception, ambiguities remain. Usually 
more attention is paid to the internal qualities of the laws themselves—such as the 
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 This tripartite set is similar but not perfectly equivalent to the “three-cornered dilemma” of 
constitutionalism, democracy, and efficiency, discussed by Elster (1988). 
12
 This is probably empirically an invalid argument.  As shown by Ingo Müller it has been proven that 
many of the most prominent judges and lawyers in Germany at the time of the Nazi takeover were 
more than willing to break or bend existing laws in a myriad of ways in the service of Nazi ideology. In 
his book Hitler’s Justice, Ingo Müller writes:  
Apart from a small minority of supporters of the (Weimar-) republic, no 
one in the German legal profession endorsed positivism any longer. Carl 
Schmitt accordingly observed in 1932 that ‘the era of the legal positivism 
has com to an end.’ And professor of constitutional law Ernst Forsthoff 
avowed in his credo of 1933, The Total State: ‘ Under no circumstances 
can the state of today draw any sustenance from positivistic thinking 
(Müller 1991:220) 
need for law to be clear, understandable, general, internally consistent, prospective, 
stable etc—rather than to defining the core principles to which a political system must 
abide to be in accordance with the rule of law. 
Searching for these core principles, we instead turn to conceptions developed within 
political science. Weingast (1997, 245) defines the rule of law as “a set of stable 
political rules and rights applied impartially to all citizens”. Similarly, O’Donnell 
(2004, 33) states a minimal definition of the rule of law as “that whatever law exists is 
written down and publicly promulgated by an appropriate authority before the events 
meant to be regulated by it, and is fairly applied by relevant state institutions 
including the judiciary”. As these definitions should make clear, the rule of law is 
perfectly compatible with our principle of impartial government institutions. This 
connection is most explicitly recognized by O’Donnell: 
By “fairly applied” I mean that the administrative application or judicial adjudication of 
legal rules is consistent across equivalent cases; is made without taking into 
consideration the class, status, or relative amounts of power held by the parties in such 
cases; and applies procedures that are preestablished, knowable, and allow a fair chance 
for the views and interests at stake in each case to be properly voiced. 
The rule of law thus embodies the principle “equality [of all] before the law”. It 
entails “a crucial principle of fairness—that like cases be treated alike” (ibid., 33-4). 
The connection between the two concepts may be stated even stronger: impartiality 
implies the rule of law. Procedural impartiality, to be accomplished in practice, 
requires a set of rules that regulate proper conduct—such as distinguishing what cases 
are “like” cases, and what specific concerns are legitimate in specific cases. The most 
general set of such rules for governing society are its laws. These laws must be 
consistently applied to everyone—including those who promulgate the laws 
themselves. No one is above the law. Thus, a corollary of impartial government 
institutions is the notion of an impartially applied legal system—the rule of law. 
Impartiality however also applies to other spheres of state action than those directly 
governed by law. When public policy is to be enacted in so-called “human 
processing” areas, such as education, health care, welfare benefits, and active labor-
market programs, widely discretionary power usually needs to be transferred to lower-
level government officials responsible for implementing policy. Impartial, non-
discriminatory behavior on behalf of these policy enactments is of course a key virtue 
according to our theory. But it falls outside the sphere of government activity 
regulated by the rule of law. In other words, the impartiality principle not only entails 
but in addition encompasses the rule of law. Its range of applicability is wider. 
Dem oc racy  
Perhaps we should expect to find even more controversy over the concept of 
democracy, often being characterized as an “essentially contested concept”. Much of 
the controversy surrounding the concept of democracy, however, can be dispelled 
once two fundamentally different levels of discourse are acknowledged (Hadenius 
1992; Hadenius and Teorell 2005). The first concerns what may be called the “basic” 
criteria of democracy: the requirements to be upheld by a country in the world in 
order to be called a “democracy”. The second concerns the more demanding criteria 
of democracy in a deeper and more perfected sense, to be accomplished once the 
basic criteria are in place. At this second level of discourse, there is profound 
disagreement over the meaning of democracy. Terms such as “responsive”, 
“participatory” and “deliberative” democracy, for example, have been coined in 
efforts to highlight some of the most distinguished dividing lines in this debate. At the 
first level of more “basic” criteria, however, students of democracy are more or less in 
agreement on what the term means. Democracy, in this basic sense, entails free, fair 
and effective elections to the chief legislative and/or executive offices of state, 
periodically held within the framework of a bundle of continually upheld political 
rights, most notably freedom of association and freedom of opinion. 
How is democracy, thus defined, related to our principle of impartial government 
institutions? First of all, it must be reiterated that the two concepts relate to two 
different dimensions of the political system. Whereas democracy works as a principle 
for regulating the access to government power, impartiality works as a constraint on 
the way this power is exercised. To a large extent, then, the two principles concern 
different things. This means that, at least in theory, we may conceive of a polity that 
works under the principle of impartiality while being undemocratic. Similarly, a 
perfectly democratic system may consistently violate the principle of impartiality in 
its enactment of public policy. As we shall argue below, the two phenomena are likely 
to be more frequently observed jointly than not. Establishing this is however a matter 
of assessing an empirical, not a conceptual, relationship.  
Nevertheless, democracy and impartiality do overlap at the conceptual level too. This 
is most readily apparent with respect to the “bundle of political rights” required to 
upheld a democratic system. Democracy, in O’Donnell’s (2001, 18) words, 
presupposes “a legal system that enacts and backs the universalistic and inclusive 
assignment of these rights”. Political rights such as freedom of association and of 
expression must be secured within a legal framework—and this framework in its turn 
must be impartially applied to all its subjects. In others words, democracy implies at 
least a minimally functioning rule of law, that is, the rule of law within the boundaries 
of political rights protection. As a consequence, democracy—by definition—entails 
impartial government institutions at least within this particular sphere of government 
action. 
Even more importantly, there is a crucial but commonly overlooked logical 
connection between the impartiality principle and the concept of free and fair 
elections. Since elections not only determine who will get into government, but also 
must be organized by government, they work as a confliction point where the 
distinction between the access to and exercise of power breaks down. If elections are 
to be considered free and, in particular, fair, they must be administered by impartial 
government institutions.  
In a widely cited article on the “menu of manipulation” open to incumbents who want 
to “carve the democratic heart out of electoral contest”, Schedler (2002, 44) notes that 
“electoral fraud involves the introduction of bias into the administration of elections”. 
Choe (1997) goes even further in developing a model of ten stages of the democratic 
electoral process, including pre-election procedures such as drawing constituency 
boundaries, election procedures such as voter registration, party- and candidate 
registration, the election campaign process, and the setting up of polling stations, as 
well as post-election procedures such as vote counting and the adjudication of 
electoral disputes. At each of these stages, Choe argues, the key to attain free and fair 
election procedures lies with the impartial election management by the chief election 
administration body (such as the electoral commission), and the judiciary. 
If either the election administration or judiciary could be hindered to function 
impartially and fairly in [the] operation of different steps of the entire electoral process, 
it would be very difficult to say that an election result itself might be regarded as 
legitimate. Therefore, to what extent an election is free and fair can also be judged by 
how independently and impartially the electoral process can be operated by the election 
administration and judiciary (Choe 1997, 42). 
A clear cut example of this is the allegations raised against Gloria Arroyo, president 
of the Philippines, to have rigged the ballot that ensured her reelection in 2004. The 
suspicions were fueled by the release of an audio tape of what was purportedly a 
conversation between Arroyo and a senior electoral official. Arroyo is heard 
questioning the official about the margin of her lead in the poll and encouraging him 
to keep it above a million votes. “We will do our best,” the official replied. 
The joint condition that the legal system enforcing political rights and the election 
process itself must be impartially administrated means that when democracy, in the 
basic sense, has been accomplished, certain spheres of government action must be 
regulated by the impartially principle. In other words, democracy and impartial 
government institutions are partially overlapping concepts. They are however by no 
means perfectly overlapping. Some amount of the one is perfectly compatible with the 
absence of the other. 
E f f e c t i vene s s /  e f f i c i ency  
We have hitherto almost exclusively concerned ourselves with QoG as a restriction on 
how government power is exercised when it is exercised. Yet it seems natural to ask to 
what extent government power is exercised in the first place. What is the state’s 
capacity for action? Economists tend to treat this as a core element of their 
governance concept. Shah (2005, xxiii), for one, considers two features of 
government performance: responsiveness (“whether the public manager is doing the 
right things—that is, delivering services consistent with citizen preferences”) and 
efficiency (“whether the public manager is doing them right—that is, providing 
services of a given quality in the least-cost manner”). Similarly, La Porta (1999) 
include “efficiency”, “successful provision of essential public goods”, and “effective 
spending” among their operational governance indicators. As these examples suggest, 
there are actually two dimensions of state capacity: the degree of successful policy 
implementation—effectiveness—and the amount of government output delivered 
relative to input—efficiency. We shall however treat these two dimensions jointly. 
The requirement that government institutions act impartially of course looses its 
meaning if it disables the government from acting at all. There must be some limit to 
the stress put on impartiality. One such limit that naturally comes to mind is 
effectiveness/efficiency considerations. The extent to which the impartiality principle 
may be realized in practice is thus contingent on possible effectiveness/efficiency 
losses incurred by its enforcement. Some such losses are probable. Treating like cases 
alike is in all likelihood more time-consuming than being systematically partial or 
simply negligent. It may also to some extent distract from the goal to successfully 
implement policy. In other words, there is a conceivable trade-off between the 
principle of impartiality and the requirement of effectiveness/efficiency. The one must 
to some extent be bought at the expense of the other. 
This trade-off is however asymmetric in the sense that impartiality is always 
preferable to efficiency/effectiveness. None of the arguments in favor of having 
impartial government institutions we have proffered in this paper apply to 
effectiveness/efficiency. The latter simply lacks an equally strong theoretical and 
normative footing. Thus, partial effectiveness/efficiency is inferior to 
ineffective/inefficient impartiality. Drawing on Petersson (1996), we could distinguish 
between those regulatory principles that incur hurdles that must be passed, and those 
principles that incur trade-offs. Impartiality is of the former kind. It can only be 
compromised to a certain extent without loosing its meaning. A civil servant cannot 
proclaim that he or she “sometimes violates the principle of impartiality” and still 
hope to be trusted as an impartial arbiter. This would imply the hurdle is not cleared. 
It is however perfectly legitimate for a civil servant to claim that “sometimes I am not 
able to perfectly live up to the standards of effectiveness/efficiency”. 
Efficiency/effectiveness is thus a trade-off principle. All else being equal, being more 
efficiency/effectiveness is always desirable. But to violate the efficiency/effectiveness 
principle is never as serious as violations of impartiality. There is no hurdle to be 
cleared. 
By implication, effectiveness/efficiency plays no independent role in our theory of 
QoG. It is only a desirable condition together with impartiality. It does however work 
as a restriction on the extent to which impartiality may be realized in practice. 
Impartial government institutions are of course not worth the while if they come at the 
cost of having no capacity for action at all. 
* * * 
To sum up, whereas impartiality supersedes one of the three competing “goods” 
considered, the rule of law, it is at least partially independent of the other two, 
democracy and efficiency/effectiveness. This means that the impartiality principle 
cannot be invoked as a claim to a complete theory of the “good polity”. It does not 
specify every desired property of the political system. This lack of completeness 
should not be seen as a weakness of our theory. On the contrary, we would argue that 
one of its virtues is to be able to delimit some spheres of politics as more relevant for 
understanding the consequences of QoG than others. To reiterate, if impartiality was 
everything then it probably would be nothing. 
Impartiality and Specific Notions of Quality of Government 
Theory aside, the heightened interest in QoG and “good governance” recently would 
not have been brought about without supportive empirical evidence that these things 
do matter for social and economic development. This empirical support has to a large 
extent been mustered with respect to some specific indicators, or features, of the QoG 
compound. Most notably, studies have been able to relate economic and/or social 
outcomes at the national level to the incidence of corruption, secure property rights, 
political stability and meritocratic bureaucracies. How does our theory of impartial 
government institutions fare with these results and their corresponding notions of 
QoG? Are they compatible with the theory? Do they follow from it? These are the 
questions discussed in this section, with respect to each specific feature in turn. 
Corrup t ion  
One of the most widely researched areas of governance is the occurrence of 
corruption. Corruption is an obvious example of dysfunctioning government 
institutions. It is both globally present and widely resented. Any theory of QoG 
should thus be able to spell out how it relates to corruption. How does the impartiality 
principle pass this test? 
The answer, obviously, depends on how corruption is defined. The received view 
nowadays defines corruption as the “abuse (or misuse) of public office for private 
gain,” or some close variant along those lines (see, e.g., Alt and Dreyer Lassen 2003, 
345; see, e.g., Treisman 2000, 399; Warren 2004, 329). This definition has some 
virtues when compared to traditional alternatives such as the “public opinion” 
(corruption is that which the public perceives to be corrupt) and “public interest” 
(corruption is that which violates the public interest) conceptions of corruption. Yet it 
suffers from a crucial weakness: it makes no reference to what kind of acts constitutes 
a “misuse” or “abuse” of public office. It has been suggested that this demarcation 
line should be drawn with reference to existing laws. That is, when a public officer 
breaks the law, he or she commits an act of corruption. This would however imply a 
country-specific conception of corruption, since what is permissible by law varies 
form country to country. As Kurer (2005, 226) puts it: “From the legality rule, it 
follows that an identical act, depending on the state of legislation, can … be either 
corrupt or non-corrupt.” We thus need a more universal conception of corruption. 
Trying to come to grips with this from the perspective of democratic theory, Warren 
(2004) defines corruption as the violation of a specific norm: the democratic norm of 
inclusion. According to Warren this norm implies that “every individual potentially 
affected by a decision should have an equal opportunity to influence the decision”. 
Thus, at the core of Warren’s conception is the notion that a holder of public office 
excludes “potentially affected” citizens from influence in the decision-making process 
(ibid., 332-334). We believe the reference to norms rather than laws in this conception 
is a step in the right direction. Yet it relies too heavily on an ideal conception of 
democracy. It takes less for a public official to commit an act of corruption, we would 
argue, than to exclude certain parties from affecting the decision. It suffices that the 
parties, excluded or not, are given unequal treatment in response to their ability to 
maximize the private gain received the public official. In other words, a substantial 
amount of corrupt acts would fly under Warren’s radar of “exclusion”.13 
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 We also have doubts about Warren’s additional criterion that the exclusion should be 
“duplicitous”— that “[t]he excluded have a claim to inclusion that is both recognized and violated by 
We thus concur with Kurer (2005, 230) in stating that “corruption involves a holder of 
public office violating the impartiality principle in order to achieve private gain”. The 
norm that is violated according to this conception is not primarily derived from 
democratic theory, since that theory, as we have already argued, is mostly occupied 
by the issue of access to power. The norm that is violated is instead the impartiality 
principle governing the exercise of public power. Its core component is the notion of 
non-discrimination. Any violation of the impartiality principle does not however 
count as corruption. We retain a key feature of the “received view”, namely the 
motivation of private gain. Again following Kurer, we may thus define corruption as 
“violations of non-discrimination norms governing the behavior of holders of public 
office that are motivated by private gain”.14 
How does this notion fit empirical studies having evidenced the harms of corruption? 
In Mauro’s (1995) seminal study, corruption reduces growth by lowering 
investment.15 Why does this happen? One prominent explanation follows from the 
theory of social capital, defined as norms about reciprocity and generalized trust in 
other people (Putnam 1993). Knack and Keefer (1997, 1252-3) discuss numerous 
ways in which social capital may promote growth: 
Individuals in higher-trust societies spend less to protect themselves from being 
exploited in economic transactions. Written contracts are less likely to be needed, and 
they do not have to specify every possible contingency. Litigation may be less frequent. 
Individuals in high-trust societies are also likely to divert fewer resources to protecting 
themselves … from unlawful (criminal) violations of their property rights. Low trust 
can also discourage innovation…Societies characterized by high levels of trust are also 
less dependent on formal institutions to enforce agreements…Trusting societies not 
only have stronger incentives to innovate and to accumulate physical capital, but are 
also likely to have higher returns to accumulation of human capital. 
Corruption, in turn, is likely to hurt social capital. We think this is due to the 
following threefold causal logic. First people make inferences from how they perceive 
public officials. If public officials are known for being partial or corrupt, citizens will 
believe that even people whom the law requires to act in the service of the public 
cannot be trusted. They will therefore conclude that most other people cannot be 
trusted either. Secondly, people  will infer that most people in a society with partial or 
corrupt officials must take part in corruption, bribery, and various forms of nepotism 
in order to obtain what they feel their rightful due. They will therefore conclude that 
most other people cannot be trusted. Thirdly, in order to make a living in such a 
society, citizens must, even though they may consider it morally wrong, also begin to 
take part in bribery, corruption, and nepotism. They will therefore conclude that since 
they cannot themselves be trusted, other people cannot generally be trusted either 
(Rothstein 2005). 
                                                                                                                                       
the corrupt” {Warren 2004). In our view this makes the concept of corruption too psychological. What 
if a public officer thinks she is doing the right thing when accepting a bribe, and doesn’t “recognize” 
the excluded’s claim to inclusion as legitimate. Is she then not “corrupt”? 
14
 We do however not agree with Kurer on the cultural relativity of what these non-discrimination 
norms mean. As we have already argued above, impartiality may be given a universal, culture-
independent  interpretation. 
15
 According to another theory corruption hurts economic performance since the opportunity to 
collect bribes work as a “secret tax” that distorts the allocation of state resources {Shleifer, 1993 #15}. 
This view of corruption as “a form of preferential treatment by public decision-makers” (Lambsdorff 
2002, 120) could also be made compatible with our “corruption-as-breaking-non-discrimination-
norms” approach, although we do not pursue that path in this paper. 
An illustration of this logic can be taken from a report issued by the United Nations 
Development Program in 2002 about the situation for “Human Development” in 
Bosnia Herzegovina. The report presents the results of a survey study showing that 
between 60 and 70 percent of respondents believe that severe corruption exists in the 
health care system, justice system, and the media. Slightly more than half believe 
corruption also exists in the various UN bodies working within the region. The 
conclusion made in the report is telling: 
For the average citizen, therefore, it seems that corruption has broken down all barriers 
and dictates the rules of life. That is not very different from saying that they interpret 
life in terms of corruption. As long as bureaucratic practice remains unreformed and 
there is a lack of transparency and accountability in public business, this will continue 
to be the case. People will use whatever mechanism they think will bring them an 
advantage and those in office will take advantage of that in their turn. (UNDP 2002, 
27). 
If corrupt public institutions not only make people distrust the political system, but 
also make them ”interpret life in terms of corruption”, then social trust is not likely to 
develop. The causal mechanisms specified here imply that individuals, in the 
methodical language of the social sciences, make an inference from the information 
they have about how their worlds work. 
Several links in this chain have gained empirical support. Anderson and Tverdova 
(2003) show that corruption lowers trust in government institutions. Kumlin and 
Rothstein (2005), moreover, document that people targeted by universal welfare 
programs, which are more likely to be perceived as fair by their recipients, are more 
trusting that people targeted by needs tested benefits. Knack and Keefer (1997), 
finally, find both that trust in other people is positively related to growth and that 
“formal institutions” affect levels of trust.  
Regardless of whether corruption hurts growth this way, the impartiality theory thus 
explains why corruption has deleterious effects on a crucial non-economic outcome: 
social capital. Finally, it casts some additional light on Anderson & Tverdova’s 
(2003) finding that support for the incumbent alleviates the effect of corruption on 
trust in government.  According to the authors this may be explained by the fact that 
“government supporters are more likely to be the beneficiaries of the goods 
distributed by corrupt public officials” (ibid., 94). This is exactly what should be 
expected from the impartiality perspective on corruption. Violation of non-
discrimination norms entails partial treatment, that is, treatment that favors some at 
the expense of others. This partial treatment is however not expected to be targeted 
haphazardly, but towards those who have contributed to bringing the incumbents to 
power. As a result, supporters of government are less negatively affected in their 
stance toward partial government institutions. 
Prop e r t y  and  Con t rac t  R i gh t s  
The probably most viable tenet within the economic governance literature is the link 
between growth and secure property and contract rights. A strong theoretical impetus 
for this connection is provided by North (1990), who asserts, for example, that “the 
inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the 
most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary 
underdevelopment in the Third World” (p. 54). The reason for this is that the kind of 
market essential for economic development requires “nonsimultaneous transactions, 
in which the quid is needed at one time or place and the quo at another” (Clague et al. 
1999, 186). Paradigmatic examples of such transactions include borrowing and 
lending, a demander and supplier some distance apart, and parties to an insurance. “In 
all of these cases”, Clague et al. (1999, 186) argue, “the gains from trade cannot be 
realized unless the parties expect that the contracts they make will be carried out.”  
Of equal importance is a guarantee that the fruits of such transactions are not at some 
later time point expropriated by the state. This is the simple theoretical case for secure 
property rights: “Growth is not possible without investment. However, investors do 
not invest when they fear confiscation of their assets by government” (Keefer 2004, 
14). 
There is some empirical evidence in support for this theory. Although this evidence to 
a large part has been static and cross-sectional, a stronger case for causality has 
recently been made through the invention of an ingenious instrument for secure 
property rights. Acemoglu et al. (2002; 2001) argue that settler mortality in former 
colonies, primarily caused by infectious diseases, should affect the setup of 
institutions governing property rights and thereby indirectly affect long-run growth 
levels. Where the disease environment caused high mortality rates, the argument goes, 
extractive institutions were installed to maximize instant exploitation of the colonies’ 
resources. In more favorable environments, by contrast, the colonies were populated 
by settlers from the colonizing countries. These settlers, in turn, demanded institutions 
that guaranteed a fairly equal distribution of property rights. These early institutions 
then persisted after independence and still hold the key to why some countries are so 
much more prosperous than others.  
Since the infectious diseases (mostly malaria and yellow fever) hardly affected the 
indigenous population, settler mortality rates are argued not to have had any effect on 
the economy of colonies other than through their effect on institutions. By thus 
exploiting differences in mortality rates as “instruments” (as the econometric jargon 
has it) for measures of the security of property rates today, these measures have been 
shown to trump all competing explanations, including geography and natural 
endowments, patterns of trade and economic policies (2002; Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001; Easterly and Levine 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). 
There are several points to be made with respect to this theory and its supportive 
evidence. The first is the reminder that “an instrument does not a theory make” 
(Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004, 154). Even if settler mortality fulfils the 
assumptions required in order to work as an instrument for secure property rights, 
settler mortality itself does not have to be part of the causal story of what determined 
the workings of today’s property rights institutions. Income levels vary widely among 
non-colonized countries as well, and this variation could never be explained with 
reference to settler mortality. Moreover, neither Acemoglu et al. (2002; 2001), nor 
anyone else, have provided any direct tests of the workings or the impact of 
institutions in the early colonial era. 
With respect to this latter point, de Soto’s (2001) account of the development of 
property rights in the US, the most prominent of “settler colonies”, convincingly 
argues that these rights were not simply transplanted by the British settlers onto US 
soil. On the contrary, it was by breaking with the legal tradition inherited from the 
British common law system that the US managed to integrate extra-legal property into 
one coherent property system (ibid., 108-159).16 More generally, de Soto (2001) 
provides a stark reminder that the economic forces unleashed by a working system of 
property rights are not simply a function of the formal or legal status of these rights; 
nor is it accomplished simply by allowing private ownership. What is required is an 
entire administrative infrastructure that records, documents, and integrates a country’s 
assets in one coherent representational system. Only with such a system in place, de 
Soto argues, can the economic potential of assets be properly fixed and recorded 
within one knowledge base that makes owners accountable and interconnected, assets 
fungible, an transactions secure (ibid., 36-68). 
This is a first crucial point where the impartiality principle enters the picture. If the 
representational system of property is to be trusted by economic agents, it must of 
course be impartially administered. Conversely, if preferential treatment on behalf of 
the public agencies responsible for administering the property system can be expected 
in return for bribes, the purpose fulfilled by the system is twisted. Thus, whereas de 
Soto (2001) addresses the imperative task of establishing an integrated property 
system, the impartiality principle kicks in as a critical tool for assessing the workings 
of this system once it has been put in place. 
At an even more fundamental level, impartial government institutions enter the theory 
of property and contract rights through the problem of enforcement. Property and 
contract rights are not primarily of importance as paper constructs, but in the ways 
they enter people’s minds. For contract rights to work in practice, the parties to a deal 
must be expected to hold their promises. Similarly, for property rights to function 
people must share the same set of beliefs as to where the borders separating one’s 
property from the others’ are located. “Remember, it is not your own mind that gives 
you certain exclusive rights over a specific asset, but other minds thinking about your 
rights in the same way you do. These minds vitally need each other to protect and 
control their assets” (de Soto 2001, 186). This implies that the actual workings of both 
contract and property rights are based on certain behavioral expectations. To separate 
what is mine from what is yours, and to able to strike a deal, I must expect certain 
behavior in return from my fellow citizens.  
As critics of Hobbes have argued for centuries, however, these expectations cannot be 
upheld solely with the use of force by a third party such as the state. As North (1990, 
58) himself puts it: “Enforcement is costly. Indeed, it is frequently costly even to find 
out that a contract has been violated, more costly to be able to measure the violation, 
and still more costly to be able to apprehend and impose penalties on the violator.” If 
every nonsimultaneous economic transaction would rely on the parties being certain 
that any future violation of the deal would be detected and punished by a third party, 
then very few such transactions would be undertaken. The transaction costs would 
simply be too high. But if, instead, these transactions could rely on an entrenched 
feeling that other people generally may be trusted, or a norm specifying that favors 
generally are returned, then transaction costs would be substantially lower. In other 
words, what helps some societies solve the problem of how to enforce contract and 
property rights is their access to a healthy stock of social capital.  
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 In a more elaborate version of their theory, however, Acemoglu et al. (2004, 61-2) argue that 
what US settlers did inherit from their country of origin was their relatively egalitarian political 
institutions, and that this in turn explained how they managed to distribute property rights so equally. 
And where does this social capital come from? Well, as already argued above, 
primarily from having impartial government institutions. Such institutions help to 
mold the long-term behavioral expectations that underpin economic transactions. As 
Clague et al. (1996, 254) put it, a notable way in which government may violate the 
property and contract rights of their subjects is by “failing to provide a legal 
infrastructure that impartially enforces contracts and adjudicates disputes about 
property rights”. What is critical to apprehend in this theory is that, once in the 
cooperative equilibrium of contracts self-enforced by trust and norms of reciprocity, 
the state hardly needs to act as the third-party enforcer. Yet it is the fact that the state 
is expected to be an impartial arbiter in case of conflict that underpins people’s trust 
and reciprocity. Like a fire department, impartial government institutions are desired 
by everyone, although everyone wishes that they would never had to be used. 
Po l i t i c a l  I n s t ab i l i t y  
Another feature of the QoG compound examined by economists is the notion of 
“political instability”. At the most general level defined as the propensity of a 
government collapse, political instability has been shown to hurt growth in cross-
country regressions (Alesina et al. 1996; Feng 1997). Why? What is the posited causal 
mechanism connecting the propensity of government breakdown to decreased 
growth? At its core the argument seems to be about the perceptions of investors or 
parties to other productive economic decisions. When these actors feel uncertain 
about who will be at the helm of the country tomorrow, they expect others to sense 
the same uncertainty. As a result, they will be less inclined to trust and abide to their 
norms of reciprocity. This uncertainty would of course have to persist for some time 
before behavioral expectations are adjusted. Eventually, however, the loss of 
confidence in the future presence of impartial government institutions to arbiter 
conflict will result in increased transaction costs and hence dampened economic 
activity. This way growth will suffer. 
As should be evident, then, the political instability argument boils down to a variant 
of the theory of secure contract and property rights. Its relationship to the impartiality 
principle thus follows along the same lines. If impartial government institutions 
cannot be trusted to endure, the social capital required to replace third-party 
enforcement will eventually erode. In this sense political stability and impartiality 
goes hand in hand. 
There is a qualification to this assertion, however, that follows when we distinguish 
between two different sources of political instability: regime changes, such as military 
coups or unconstitutional seizures of power, and changes in the personnel of 
government or of the head of the executive (Feng 1997, 395). Clague et al. (1996) 
convincingly argue, and provide some supportive evidence to the effect, that property 
and contract rights may be secure even in autocracies as long as the incumbent 
autocrat has a high expected survival rate. In democracies, on the other hand, it is not 
the expected duration of the incumbent government but of the democratic regime 
itself that strengthens economic rights. In terms of “political stability”, then, regime 
stability supports property and contract rights in democracies, whereas government 
stability fulfils the same function in autocracies.  
This might explain the inherently ambiguous results in the literature with respect to 
whether having a democratic or an authoritarian political system matters for growth 
(for excellent overviews, see Kurzman, Werum, and Burkhart 2002; Przeworski and 
Limongi 1993; for excellent overviews, see Sirowy and Inkeles 1990). The 
mechanisms through which this occurs are completely different under the two 
different regime types. More importantly for the current context, Clague et al.’s 
(1996) theory sounds plausible in terms of how political stability is related to 
impartiality under different regime types. Even an autocrat may support impartial 
government institutions as long as he or she experiences a high expected survival rate. 
However, since “[a]ny autocratic society will sooner or later come to have rulers with 
short time horizons due to succession crises or other causes” (ibid., 246), democracies 
with high expected survival rates are likely to be even more conducive to impartiality. 
The democracy–impartiality equilibrium is likely to be stronger and even self-
supportive. This is why we should expect a positive relationship between democracy 
and impartiality. 
The  “Webe r i an ”  S t a t e  H ypo the s i s  
A sociological strand in the governance literature that deserves mentioning, finally, is 
what has been termed the “Weberian” state hypothesis. Drawing on previous 
comparative work on the “developmental state” of East Asia (Evans 1989), Rauch and 
Evans (2000) were able to gather unprecedented data on the structure of bureaucracies 
in 35 developing countries. Most notably, these data reflect the extent to which 
bureaucracies employ meritocratic recruitment (as opposed to recruitment reflecting 
partisan or patrimonial spoils), and the extent to which they supply civil servants with 
competitive salaries and long-term career paths through internal promotion. These 
organizational properties turn out to be strongly related to the subjective ratings of 
corruption and bureaucratic efficiency employed by Mauro (1995) and Knack and 
Keefer (1995). In addition, they turn out to be significantly related to economic 
growth (Evans and Rauch 1999). 
These findings and the theory that suggests them is perfectly compatible with the 
impartiality theory. There is a straightforward causal story underlying this connection. 
Organizational features such as meritocratic recruitment, competitive salaries and 
internal promotion not only is likely to raise the competence of civil servants. They 
also help to insulate government institutions from pressures of the surrounding society 
and engender an ‘esprit de corps’. Thereby, internal systems of norms regulating 
professional behavior are facilitated. And the impartiality principle in essence can 
only be upheld through such norms of conduct among individuals responsible for 
implementing public policy. Thus, the “Weberian” state hypothesis is by no means ad 
odds with the impartiality theory. On the contrary, it contributes to the latter by 
highlighting what organizational structures are likely to promote impartial behavior. 
Concluding Remarks 
The development of the ethics and norms that underlies the principle of impartiality 
seems to be a long and complicated process (cf. Rueschemeyer 2005). In societies 
dominated by patronage and neo-patrimonial structures and/or strong notions of tribal 
belongings, the idea of civil servants acting on the principles of impartiality when 
wielding public power may not even exist in the mindset of most people. On the 
contrary, if given a position in the public administration, the dominant idea is to use it 
to further ones specific interests, be that clan, tribe, family or whatever special 
interests. As stated by Dele Olowu: 
political life in Africa as in other Third World regions is characterized by patron-client 
relationships. The public sector becomes and instrument for building public support for 
factions that are competing for power... The public sector is therefore dysfunctional in 
serving the public, but critical to the survival and sustenance of those who wield 
executive power ...as a result.... the public service lack even the basic meritocratic 
features of efficiency, productivity, and other universalistic values (Olowu 2000). 
Moreover, the idea of impartiality when wielding public power has in all likelihood 
not existed for that very long in most western liberal democracies (cf. Ertman 2005). 
In the case we know best (Sweden) it was not until the latter half of the 19th century 
that this principle became dominant in the civil service. Until then, many public 
officials looked on their positions as something similar to a feudal enfeoffment, i.e., 
something they could use more or less as their property to extract private resources 
from (Rothstein 1998). This is not the place to go into a detailed analysis of why the 
principles of impartiality have come to dominate the public administration ethos in 
some parts of the world but not in other (but see Ertman 2005). One possibility is that 
impartiality is a mental construction in the same way as Hernando de Soto has argued 
about the development of “capital”.  
To give a very short recapitulation of de Soto’s (2001)well-known argument: Capital 
is not the same as assets or even property. For assets/property to become capital, it has 
to become a universally accepted legal construction by which ownership is generally 
respected. Through such a normative/legal invention assets/property that becomes 
capital can be used for example as a security for loans and of course exchanged. The 
point is that de Soto shows that for this to happen in the Western world it took a long 
and very complex process of legal development that lasted for several hundred years. 
The feudal idea of what constituted property was for example very different from the 
modern/capitalist idea. According to de Soto, assets can not be transformed to and 
used as capital until it is recognized by “all” others and that demands not only a strong 
legal framework but also a change of mind of both the public and those who are 
responsible for securing property rights.  
Our argument about impartiality follows the same line of reasoning. As “capital”, the 
notion of civil servants behaving according to the principles of impartiality in the 
exercise of public power is a mindset or established “system of beliefs” that in our 
part of the world may have taken a very long time to develop. The idea that when 
given a job in the government, one should not primarily see this as an asset that can be 
used to serve ones own, family, clan, or tribe interest, etc., but that policies should be 
impartially implemented in accordance with what is stated in the law may, as with the 
legal structures that creates “capital”, have taken a very long to develop 
(Rueschemeyer 2005). As with capital, this has probably required both a legal 
framework to make civil servants accountable and a conceptual development of the 
importance of ethics in the public service. How and under what circumstances this 
process has come about would be an important task for future research in QoG.17 
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 Contrary to our beliefs when we started this project, the concept of impartiality has not been high 
on the agenda in social science research on bureaucracy and public administration. The newly issued 
664 p. “Handbook of Public Administration” has no index entry on “impartiality” (Peters and Pierre 
2002). A search on the Social Science Citation Index (Web of Science) gives a total of three published 
articles with the keyword impartiality combined with any of the following keywords: bureaucracy, 
public administration, civil service, public service. The database searches for keywords are both those 
given in the title, in the keywords given by the authors or in the abstract. 
References 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon  Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. Reversal of 
Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern Income 
Distribution. The Quarterly Journal of Econometrics 118:1231-94. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. The Colonial 
Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. The American 
Economic Review 91 (5):1369-401. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2004. Institutions as the 
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth. 
Alesina, Alberto, Sule Özler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel. 1996. Political 
Instability and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Growth 1 (2):189-211. 
Alt, James E., and David Dreyer Lassen. 2003. The Political Economy of Institutions 
and Corruption in American States. Journal of Theoretical Politics 15 (3):341-65. 
Anderson, Christopher J., and Yuliya V. Tverdova. 2003. Corruption, Political 
Allegiances, and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies. 
American Journal of Political Science 47 (1):91-109. 
Arneson, Richard. 1998. The Priority of the Right Over the Good Rides Again. In 
Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice, edited by P. Kelly. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Barry, Brian. 1995. Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bennett, Christopher. 1995. Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse. Causes, Course and 
Consequences. London: Hurst and Company. 
Brehm, John, and Scott Gates. 1997. Working, Shirking, and Sabotage. Bureaucratic 
Response to a Democratic Public. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Carothers, Thomas. 1998. The Rule of Law Revival. Foreign Affairs 77 (2):95-106. 
Choe, Yonhyok. 1997. How To Manage Free and Fair Elections: A Comparison of 
Korea, Sweden and the United Kingdom, Department of Political Science, 
Göteborg University, Göteborg. 
Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson. 1996. 
Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies. Journal of 
Economic Growth 1 (2):243-76. 
Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson. 1999. 
Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic 
Performance. Journal of Economic Growth 4 (2):185-211. 
Cupit, Geoffrey. 2000. When Does Justice Require Impartiality? London: Political 
Studies Association- UK 50th Annual Conference, April 10-13. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
de Jasay, Anthony. 1996. Justice as Something Else. Cato Journal 16:161-74.. 
de Soto, Hernando. 2001. The Mystery of Capital. London: Bantam Press. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. London: Duckworth. 
Easterly, William. 2001. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and 
Misadventures in the Tropics. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 2003. Tropics, germs, and crops: how 
endowments influence economic development. Journal of Monetary Economic 
50:3-39. 
Elster, Jon. 1988. Introduction. In Constitutionalism and Democracy, edited by J. 
Elster and R. Slagstad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ertman, Thomas. 2005. Building States - Inherently a Long-Term Process? An 
Argument from Comparative History. In States and Development: Historical 
Antecedents of Stagnation and Advance, edited by M. Lange and D. 
Rueschemeyer. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan. 
Esaiasson, Peter, and S. ren Holmberg. 1996. Representation from above: members of 
Parliament and representative democracy in Sweden. Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
Evans, Peter. 2005. Harnessing the State: Rebalancing Strategies for Monitoring and 
Motivation. In States and Development, edited by M. Lange and D. Rueschemeyer. 
New York: Palgrave/Macmillan. 
Evans, Peter B. 1989. Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A 
Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State. Sociological 
Forum 4 (4):561-87. 
Evans, Peter, and James E. Rauch. 1999. Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National 
Analysis of the Effects of "Weberian" State Structures on Economic Growth. 
American Sociological Review 64 (5):748-65. 
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. Etnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. 
American Political Science Review 97 (1):75-90. 
Feng, Yi. 1997. Democracy, Political Stability and Economic Growth. British Journal 
of Political Science 27:391-418. 
Frey, Bruno S., and Alois Stutzer. 2000. Happiness, Economy and Institutions. The 
Economic Journal 110:918-38. 
Hadenius, Axel. 1992. Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell. 2005. Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of 
Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence. Studies in Comparative International 
Development 39 (4):87-106. 
Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones. 1999. Why Do Some Countries Produce So 
Much More Output Per Worker Than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 
(1):83-116. 
Helliwell, John F. 2003. How's Life? Combining Individual and National Variables to 
Explain Subjective Well-being. Economic Modeling 20:331-60. 
Huther, Jeff, and Anwar Shah. 2005. A Simple Measure of Good Governance. In 
Public Services Delivery, edited by A. Shah. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Jones, Bryan D. 1999. Bounded Rationality. Annual Review of Political Science 
2:297-321. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Art Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2004. Governance Matters 
III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002: The World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3106. 
Keefer, Philip. 2004. A Review of the Political Economy of Governance: From 
Property Rights to Voice: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3315. 
Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. 1995. Institutions and Economic Performance: 
Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures. Economics and 
Politics 7 (3):207-27. 
Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. 1997. Does Social Capital Have an Economic 
Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 
(4):1251-88. 
Kohli, Atul. 2004. State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization 
in the Global Periphery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kornai, János. 2000. Hidden in an Envelope. Gratitude Payments to Medical Doctors 
in Hungary. Budapest: Collegium Budapest Institute for Advanced Study. 
Kumlin, Staffan, and Bo Rothstein. 2005. Making and Breaking Social Capital: The 
Impact of Welfare-State Institutions. Comparative Political Studies 38 (4):339-65. 
Kurer, Oskar. 2005. Corruption: An Alternative Approach to Its Definition and 
Measurement. Political Studies 53:222-39. 
Kurzman, Charles, Regina Werum, and Ross E. Burkhart. 2002. Democracy's Effect 
on Economic growth: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1951-1980. Studies in 
Comparative International Development 37 (1):3-33. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 
1999. The Quality of Government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 
15 (1):222-79. 
Lambsdorff, Johan Graf. 2002. Corruption and Rent-seeking. Public Choice 113:97-
125. 
Lange, Matthew. 2005. The Rule of Law and Development: A Weberian Framework 
of States and State-Society Relations. In States and Development, edited by M. 
Lange and D. Rueschemeyer. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan. 
Letki, Natalia. 2003. Investigating The Roots of Civic Morality: Trust, Civic 
Community, and Institutional Performance. Oxford: Nuffield College Working 
Papers in Politics. 
Lundström, Mats. 2004. "Engagemang och opartiskhet." Pp. 207-244 in Engagemang, 
mångfald och integration. Om möjligheter och hinder för politisk jämlikhet. 
Rapport från integrationspolitiska utredningen (SOU 2004:49), edited by Anders 
Westholm, Karin Borevi, and Per Strömblad. Stockholm: Fritzes. 
March, James B., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The 
Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Basic Books. 
Mauro, Paolo. 1995. Corruption and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
110 (3):681-712. 
Mendus, Susan. 2002. Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Müller, Ingo. 1991. Hitler's Justice: the courts in the Third Reich. London: Tauris. 
North, Douglas. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
O'Donnell, Guillermo. 2001. Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics. Studies in 
Comparative International Development 36 (1):7-26. 
O'Donnell, Guillermo. 2004. Why the Rule of Law Matters. Journal of Democracy 15 
(4):32-46. 
Olofsdotter, Helena. 2002. Levd erfarenhet och policyförändringar. In Välfärdsstat i 
otakt: Om politikens oförutsedda, oavsiktliga och oväntade konskekvenser (under 
publicering), edited by J. Pierre and B. Rothstein. Malmö: Liber. 
Olowu, Dele. 2000. Bureacracy and Democratic Reform. In African Perspectives on 
Governance, edited by G. Hyden, D. Olowy and H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo. Trenton, 
New Jersey: Africa World Press. 
Peters, B. Guy, and Jon Pierre, eds. 2002. Handbook of Public Administration. 
London: Sage Publications. 
Petersson, Olof. 1996. Rättsstaten. Frihet, rättssäkerhet och maktdelning i dagens 
politik. Stockholm: Publica. 
Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1993. Political Regimes and Economic 
Growth. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (3):51-69. 
Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 
Rauch, James E., and Peter B. Evans. 2000. Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic 
Performance in Less Developed Countries. Journal of Public Economics 75:49-71. 
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. Institutions Rule: 
The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic 
Development. Journal of Economic Growth 9:131-65. 
Rose, Jonathan. 2004. The Rule of Law in the Western World: An Overview. Journal 
of Social Philosophy 35 (4):457-70. 
Rose, Richard, and Doh Chull Shin. 2001. Democratization Backwards: The Problem 
of Third-Wave Democracies. British Journal of Political Science 31:331-54. 
Rothstein, Bo. 1996. The Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and the 
Bureaucratic Problem of Social Reforms. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press. 
Rothstein, Bo. 1998. State Building and Capitalism: The Rise of the Swedish 
Bureaucracy. Scandinavian Political Studies 21 (2):287-306. 
Rothstein, Bo. 2003. Social Capital, Economic Growth and Quality of Government: 
The Causal Mechanism. New Political Economy 8 (1):49-71. 
Rothstein, Bo. 2005. Social Traps and the Problem of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rothstein, Bo, and Dietlind Stolle. 2003. Social Capital, Impartiality, and the Welfare 
State: An Institutional Approach. In Generating Social Capital: The Role of 
Voluntary Associations, Institutions and Government Policy, edited by M. Hooghe 
and D. Stolle. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan. 
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich. 2005. Building States - An Argument from Theory. In States 
and Development, edited by M. Lange and D. Rueschemeyer. New York: 
Palgrave/Macmillan. 
Schedler, Andreas. 2002. The Menu of Manipulation. Journal of Democracy 13 
(2):36-50. 
Schiemann, John W. 2002a. History and Emotions, Beliefs and Mental 
Models:Toward a Hermeneutics of Rational Choice. Paper read at American 
Political Science Association Meeting, at Boston, Ma. 
Schiemann, John W. 2002b. History and Emotions. Bleiefs and Mental Models: 
Toward a Hermenetics of Rational Choice. Boston: Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association. 
Shah, Anwar. 2005. Overview. In Public Services Delivery, edited by A. Shah. 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Sirowy, Larry, and Alex Inkeles. 1990. The Effects of Democracy on Economic 
Growth and Inequality: A Review. Studies in Comparative International 
Development 25 (1):126-57. 
Strömberg, Håkan. 2000. Allmän förvaltningsrätt. Mamlö: Liber. 
Tanzi, Vito. 2000. Policies, Institutions and the Dark Side of Economics. 
Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
Tebble, Adam James. 2002. What is the Politics of Difference. Political Theory 30 
(2):259-81. 
Treisman, Daniel. 2000. The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-national Study. Journal 
of Public Economics 76:399-457. 
UNDP. 2002. Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a 
Fragmented World. New York: United Nations Development Program - Oxford 
University Press. 
Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Justice. New 
York: Basic Books. 
Warren, Mark E. 2004. What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy? American 
Journal of Political Science 48 (2):328-43. 
Weingast, Barry. 1997. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law. 
American Political Sceince Review 91 (2):245-63. 
Young, Iris M. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Young, Iris Marion. 1993. Together in Difference. Transforming the Logic of Group 
Political Conflict. In Principled Positions. Postmodernism and the Rediscovery of 
Value, edited by J. Squires. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
Zakaria, Fareed. 2003. The future of freedom: illiberal democracy at home and 
abroad. 1. ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 
 
 
 
